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TOLERANCE, INTOLERENCE AND EDUCATION IN THE CONDITIONS OF PLURALISM OF OPINIONS

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Pluralism traditionally opposes monism, universalism, totalitarianism, dogmatism, that is to say, constructions and concepts in which a whole is placed above its parts, the general above the individual and unity above plurality. The recognition of plurality in all areas of life is linked with the acceptance (of freedom) of the individual, the separate and the special in all their manifestations, including independent individual thought, acting and creativity. At a practical level the declared freedom «cogito» does not automatically lead to the realisation of «I am»; individual and independent thought is increasingly manifested in the form of mass consciousness, in the form of the «voluntary» subordination of individual thought to the general standard. The aforementioned determinants fundamentally influence the nature of present education.

Key words: tolerance, intolerance, voluntarism, pluralism, postmodernism, ideology, freedom, education system.

Pluralism of opinions as an attributive characteristic of post-modern society appears as a general ideological principle influencing and regulating relations, in fact, in any areas of social life. The discourse on it collects ontological, gnozeological, political, economic, axiological, aesthetic and many other aspects and in each of the areas, and reveals specific forms of demonstration. The common feature in each case is that pluralism not only presupposes but also legitimises the coexistence of various different aspects appearing in the form of, for example, mutually non-reducing substances, value or ideological positions, contradictory statements etc.

Pluralism is traditionally the opposite of monism, universalism, totalitarianism, dogmatism, that is to say, the constructions and concepts in which a whole is placed above its parts, the general above the individual, the universal above the particular, unity above plurality. The result of recognizing plurality in all areas of life is the acceptation (of freedom) of the individual, the separate and the special in all their manifestations, including independent individual thought, acting, value systems and creativity as well. It is absolutely common that pluralism is considered as an attributive principle of democratic organization of society and as a guarantee of democratic freedoms (the freedom of speech also presupposes pluralism of opinions and attitudes).

However, the reality of everyday life reveals a paradoxical state: the declared freedom of thought, the value of individual and independent thought is increasingly manifested in the form of mass consciousness, in the form of the voluntary subordination of individual thought to the general standard. Own opinions that should present and manifest individual thought are often just cheap demagogy, a committed position, a fashionable attitude or retelling. We register that individual thought, unable or unwilling to gain own knowledge and adopt attitudes, freely dissolves and then disappears in the general opinion and mass consciousness.

Instead of individual, non-standard and independent thought the pluralistic reality also «produces» standardised and mass thought. We consider this «escape from freedom» as an uncommon solution to the difficulties that individual thought confronts within the «offered» pluralistic (picture) world and as a resulting effect of the unadapted education system, or insufficient use of its internal potential.

The analysis of relations and determinations between individual thought and pluralistic interpretations of the world and their requirements currently appears to be appropriate. The problem here is not the world – that is One. Our stories (narration) about this world, our interpretations and chosen cognitive strategies are the problem. The discovery of elements of positive stimulation encouraging the development of individual thought and the parameters of the pluralistic environment that are reasons for «escape from freedom» are important not only in the theoretical but also practical level.

Because the principle of pluralism presupposes (enables) a set of different or even alternating value and ideological positions, attitudes, opinions, conceptions, ideas, out of which none of them can call for the absolute truth, it confirms the principle of equality and the principle of legitimacy in terms of their presentation. Despite the expected theoretical and practical problem we do not usually refuse the statement in which none of the opinions may have *a priori* pretension to express truth. However, questioning the cognitive process in general and disputing its outcome is counterproductive and demotivating. Stating that no one knows the truth or that there is no truth at all causes paralysis of individual thought under certain conditions and contributes to desertion from the space of cognition and deformation of educational projects. For many, cognition is not a value anymore. We are confronted with a perverted form of the behaviour of democratically elected representatives who, as power representatives within their competences, also usurp the right and legitimacy for representing us in the domain of thought that no one delegated to them!

We do not consider the issue of pluralism as a matter of modern or postmodern situation. The questions of pluralism of opinions, of equality (equal rights) and dispersion (sublimation) of individual thought in an uncommon manner was solved by sophists in the past. The Protagoras' famous statement that «Man is the measure of all things; of things that are not, that they are not; of things that are, that they are ...» [10, B 1] can be considered as an essential expression of sophistic pluralism.

Socrates in his dialogue to Theaetetus explains the main position of Protagoras: «Well, is not this about what he means, that individual things are for me such as they appear to me, and for you in turn such as they appear to you -- you and I being man? ... For as each person perceives things, such they are to each person» [10, B 1]. According to the available information it is possible to conclude that Protagoras in this context does not differentiate between individual persons – for him *«each person* is the measure of all things». The importance of the aforementioned lies in making everyone equal in terms of opinions, conceptions, attitudes and their weight. Although Protagoras admits that not all individuals are equally wise, there is a principle that «no one has a true assumption, and nor do you – whether you want or do not want to – you must admit that you are the measure». [10, A 21a]. In Protagoras' statement *«Man is the measure...»* there is a simultaneously anticipated refusal of the common and universal truth and confirmation of equality of all subjects concerning having the truth. *«*Protagoras acknowledges that what appears to one is true, and so he introduces relativism...» [10, A 14].

The importance of the main sophistic proposition may possibly be understood in the context of specific historic conditions that enabled (elicited) and also spread the initiatives of

sophists. As a standard the school of sophists is rather deemed as an educational strategy than a philosophical doctrine and the initiative of Protagoras and sophists can also be perceived as a great deed in overcoming the aristocratic outlook on education and the approach to it, and as an ambition to influence the public life. Sophists presented cognition as widely available in the conditions of the existing political establishment by a motivational and encouraging challenge (everyone is the measure...) and by disputing authorities of any kind. Such a political shift towards making the role of opinions of free citizens in Greek cities more important encouraged activation of individual thought of citizens of the democratic polis. However, in contradiction to the tradition they emphasized paideia – rearing and education of others instead of sophia and the problem of truth became a matter of opinion for sophists.

However, Socrates and Plato noticed a specific focus of educational strategy of sophists. According to Protagoras a weakness of the existing educational strategy is that « ... teachers ... torture the young people by forcing them, who just escaped from science, back into the study of science, even though the youth does not like it. They force upon them the teaching of mathematics, astronomy, geometry and music». This must change. But what Protagoras himself offered to the clients of his school? «But the youth coming to me, will learn nothing but what they desire to learn. I teach them how you become successful with your personal business affairs. And in what concerns political affairs, I educate them in such a way, that they develop the skills - in words and deeds - to be able, and most efficiently so, to participate in governing the state» [10, A 5]. It is evident that such educational programme focused not on mastering a specific science, art, craft but on acquiring the part of general education that would be efficient at managing their own and social matters. The art to manage («political art») is placed above specific knowledge and art. Therefore, according to Protagoras the one «who can carry out a transformation from what appears to one as evil and is evil, to making it appear good and be good». [10, A 21a]. The main instrument of success is language and dialectics as an art to prove and persuade, not cognition, understanding, justification. In fact, it is not necessary for one to be an expert in the area to be able to manage or recommend. The result included deformations about which Socrates talked as well: «... not one of those paid private teachers, whom the people call sophists ... teaches anything other than the convictions the masses hold when they are assembled together» [10, 493 A] and this they call wisdom. The use moods and tendencies of large assemblies consisting of different people, manipulate with them and, if they fail to convince with words they apply pressure - «the ones who do not obey them are punished by denial of the civil right, financial penalties and death» [10, 492 E]. Here and there the reader gets a feeling that Socrates is our contemporary and responds to today's reality!

In the conditions of ancient Greece two levels of the principle of pluralism developed: the level of independently understood education that did not focus on mastering a specific art or area of knowledge, but may have positively stimulated individual thought. The proposition – «everyone has their own truth» undermined the power of authority and created space for presentation and defence of their own position, opinion. The other side of the coin was the development of a destructive potential of the aforementioned challenge – when transforming it to a maxim it equalized opinions of experts and laymen or dilettantes, teachers and students. Reflecting the above into the practical level opened unprecedented and not less absurd space for fostering any opinions on anything. The absence of critical, self-critical a reflective evaluation of opinions factually to each «self» recognized the right to express opinions on a subject or situation in a range of possibilities – from sound and qualified attitude through radical dilettantism. The principle of equality of statements developed its «negative potential»

in mass consciousness and significantly contributed to a loss of individuality, certainties and to increasing uncertainty at the expense of strengthening the manipulators (power).

The form of coping with the theoretical and practical aftermath of the widespread acceptance of the principle of pluralism was clear – sophists became an «episode» and the ancient Greeks preferred orderly Cosmos to disorderly and endless Chaos. As Deleuze noted: «... Greek spirit always lived under the impression that signs, mute speech of things are a disfigured, unstable and deceptive system, the ruins of Logo that dialectics must restore, *philia* reconcile, *sophia* harmonize, the Reason, that precedes, take control of» [4, p. 126].

The modern times are critically coping with the legacy of modernism by radically refusing narratives about a universal reason common for all, that is able to uncover the common purpose and goal of history but also achieve the ultimate liberation of humans. In postmodernism meta-narratives about great goals, universal truths, timeless ideas and great heroes lost their credibility and persuasiveness. The original great unity was replaced by plurality – we all suddenly found ourselves in the world in which everyone's life is a point of intersection of various stories, goals, logics, principles, meanings, out of which none can call for universality. Society stopped being locked by the only principle, the only meaning, the only goal, the only structure; it has become open, in which all existing universalistic expectations suddenly became fictions.

Through revealing new horizons of understanding language, postmodernism, by its radical «turn to language», dismisses the world of subject-object relations, disputed discourse as a reliable interface (intermediary) that allowed the subject for whole centuries to keep in touch with the natural world and postulates it (discourse) as the selfhood that does not depend on humans and society whatsoever, not to mention nature.

According to Derrida, a critic of the classic (static) concept of the sign, there is no privileged (no transcendental) signified and the interplay of signifying has no limit. According to him one must even reject the concept of the word «sign» itself - for the signification «sign» has always been comprehended and determined, in its sense, as sign-of, signifier referring to a signified, signifier different from its signified. The ubiquitous dynamism eliminates serious differences between the signifier (intelligible) and the signified (sensible) (thus, according to Derrida, we must give up the metaphysical concept as well as the word «signifier» itself). The actual sign in itself erases the contrast between the sensible (signified) and the intelligible (signifier). [5, s. 180] According to Derrida there are two ways of erasing the difference between the signifier and the signified: one, the classic way, consists in reducing or deriving the signifier (sensible), that is to say, ultimately in submitting the sign to thought, but this (classic) way is outdated now and counterproductive in the current conditions; the other one consists in putting into question the system in which the preceding reduction functioned: first and foremost, the opposition between the sensible and the intelligible. The significance of the sign is not «guaranteed» anymore by the structure of language. On one hand, the sign is determined by its difference from other signs; on the other hand, the difference is nothing stable, constant, because the form differentiating the limits of signs has always been on the move. This way the domain of meaning became independent and started to exist as a selfsufficient world. The world of humans (the identity of a talking and thinking subject, social and historical context, etc.) and the world of nature were put in brackets. The basic terms of the «world» of signs include «language system», «significant», «simulacrum», «text», «writing», «death of the author», «quoting», «deconstruction», «decentralization».

The incorporation of the principle of pluralism presupposed to come to terms with the philosophical tradition that was built on categories of absolutum, necessity, law, general. Therefore, it was not surprising that overcoming Platonism became one of the main roles of

current (postmodern) philosophy (Deleuze). Plato sought to distinguish the real (world) from the unreal, true from untrue. His dialectics, that juxtaposes original and copy, from the very beginning presupposes the inequality: model, original (idea) is always better than its copy. Nor copies themselves are equivalent - depending on the level of approaching the model they may be «good» or «bad». It is apparent that such understanding contradicts the principle of pluralism that is built on recognizing equality of all forms of the individual and rejecting the general as superior. The rejection of the contradiction of the idea and its imperfect copy developed conditions for equalizing individualities, without a common model of individuality they acquired independent existence and in this respect they became equal. The position of the couple «idea – copy» was replaced by a neologism simulacrum as a synonym of the only real being. The reality transformed to a world of simulacrums in which identities are only simulated, formed as an optical "effect" of a much more comprehensive play - a play on differences and repetitions. Since being is presented only in the form of variety and diversity of equivalent and equal simulacrums, it is possible from that perspective fundamentally refuse all that was traditionally categorized under general, universal, necessary, including generally significant standards and values.

The introduction of simulacrum can be understood as a specific expression of the principle of pluralism in the context of the opposition of postmodern philosophy against traditional philosophy (in this case platonian). To a certain extent it is possible to refuse a general idea, model, example to consider as «antidogmatic initiative» but what absents (and there is no interest in it either!) is the *principle of selection* between particular, individual, accidental — because they all are equal. This approach (without pressure on selection) eventually rather plays into the hands of *passive reason* than its stimulation.

The incorporation of the principle of pluralism required not only to clarify the systems having pretension to logical reasoning of general relations of the objective world (that were labelled as «masks of dogmatism») but also «coping with the past». Any obligations to the past, traditions, to authors and their works are rejected. In this respect Barthes notes that «each historical moment can in fact believe that it has possession of the canonical meaning of a given literary work, but it's only a matter of enlarging history somewhat in order to transform this univocal meaning into a plural meaning and this closed literary work into an open literary work. The definition of work itself is changing: it is not only a historical fact, it is becoming an anthropological fact, since no history can exhaust its meaning. The variety of meanings is not a matter of a relativist approach to human mores; it designates not the tendency that society has to err but a disposition towards openness; the work holds several meanings simultaneously, by its very structure, and not as a result of some infirmity in those who read it. Therein lies its symbolic nature: the symbol is not the image but the very plurality of meanings» [1, s. 102]. Therefore, the role of literary science is to bring literary work closer, even it is subscribed by its author to a myth that does not have an author. It is a fundamental shift in the current experience and opinions, «that the author can lay claim to the meaning of his work and can himself make that its legal meaning, from this notion flows the unreasonable interrogation directed by the critic at the dead writer, at his life, at the traces of his intentions, so that he himself can guarantee the meaning of his work: people want at all costs to make the dead person, or a substitute for him, speak. Such substitutes may be his historical period, the genre, the vocabulary, in a word everything that is contemporary with the author...» [1, p. 107].

Assigning a text to an author, according to Barthes, means to lock it up, to bring it to pure explicitness, to give it the final and single meaning, to silence anyone who reads it. Thus,

as he says: «Death has another significance: it renders unreal the author's signature and transforms the work into myth...». [1, p. 107]. Also Franz Kafka expresses the Barthes' thought In this spirit in his footnote: «What causes posterity's judgment on the individual to be more correct than that of contemporaries lies within death. One develops in one's own way only after one's death...». [1, p. 107]. Basically, Deleuze supports the identical position when he writes that the question of origin is not asked for the problem of origin is not open at all. It is not necessary at all for someone to be the originator of the statement and the statement itself does not refer back to any cogito, that is to say, to its originator, author, nor to a transcendental subject that would enable it, nor to the Self that would utter it for the first time, nor to the Spirit of the era that would preserve, reproduce and compare it. [3, p. 15]. According to Barthes Text means *«Fabric»* but whereas until now we have always taken this fabric as a product, a readymade veil behind which meaning (truth) lurks more or less hidden, we are now accentuating, in the fabric, the generative idea that the text makes itself through a perpetual intertwining» [1, p. 160].

«By erasing» the author of a text we dismiss the final meaning of the text and open multidimensional sensual space. However, Barthes puts constraints to wilfulness in his interpretations when he writes: «It is sterile to bring the work down to pure explicitness, since then *immediately* there is nothing more to say about it and since also the function of the work cannot be to seal the lips of those who read it; but it is hardly less vain to seek in the work what it might be saying without actually saying it …» [1, p. 115]. However, in relation to the latter, he does not even point at a potential «informer» (censor, critic) who tells the author of the account that his interpretation is incorrect because his work does not bear such a meaning.

Postmodernism dismisses all references (and also the existence itself) to a centre, to a subject, principally refuses a privileged reference to an absolute origin or to an absolute arché. Derrida directly writes that the philosophical or epistemological requirement of a centre appears as a historical illusion [See: 5, p. 187–189). The centre is no natural locus, but a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions comes into play. Thus, when there is an absence of a centre (origin), everything becomes discourse, that is to say, a system in which the central, original or transcendental signified is never absolutely present [5, p. 179]. Decentralisation is understood as a (positive?) alternative of centralization, that is to say, of all the principles of arrangement and organization. In principle, an absence of a centre means an absence of a unifying principle, common orientation, and authority. From the position of decentralisation it is possible to bring under criticism any general principle, whether it is a substance or an author of text. The elimination of similar centres is one of the substantial conditions for creation of a pluralistic environment.

Pluralism within postmodern reflection is a key principle not only in learning and interpretation of the world. It fully extends to the human who is not understood as an individual anymore, as an integrity signifying more or less compact and coherent thought and behaviour. In terms of the aforementioned shift in understanding humans Deleuze observed that «structuralism is not at all a form of thought that suppresses the subject, but one that breaks it up and distributes it systematically, that contests the identity of the subject, that dissipates it and makes it shift from place to place, an always nomad subject, made of individuations, but impersonal ones, or of singularities, but pre-individual ones» [2, p. 47]. In other words, an individual person does not appear as the autonomous Cartesian subject (with the maxim «Cogito, ergo sum»), that has a congenital or essential identity existing independently of language. Contrary to what we usually call «Self», the philosophers of postmodernism interpret as socially constructed fiction (although real), as a product of language and specific discourses.

The human's internal division is also expressed in the postmodern conception of quotations of thought. According to Barthes (as well as Foucault) the text, consciousness of its author and also the consciousness of its interpreter are factually only a summary of quotations. The process of text creation is a play with ready-made lingual fragments – quotations. The principle of quoting is deeply pluralistic, presupposes chaotic, disorderly blending of various elements. It is an insurmountable and irrevocable pluralism (chaos) in the head of the subject.

We are «forced» to accept the pluralistic nature of the world (environment) also by fundamental shifts in the interpretation of the cognitive process and its central category - the truth. The cycle of cognition (including the scientific one) begins from applying epistémé, that is to say, a system of a certain order that preregulates with what and how our knowledge deals with. This innovative form of rationalism, or to be more precise, theoretism (we understand theoretism as a methodological antipode of empirism), predefines the space of a specific culture, defines the space and way of organization of the world, and even the way of thought in this and not another way. «There is one aspect, however concealed it may be, of the logos, by means of which the Intelligence always comes before, by which the whole is already present, the law already known before what it applies to: this is the dialectical trick by which we discover only what we have already given ourselves, by which we derive from things only what we have already put there». [4, p. 120]. Therefore, it is fully legitimate that each subject expresses the world from a certain (its) viewpoint and therefore expresses an absolutely different world. The expressed world does not exist actually outside of that which expresses it. The so-called outside world is, according to Deleuze, just a deceptive projection, constraint, that uniforms all the expressed worlds [4, p. 54].

According to Deleuze «cognition, learning ... essentially concerns signs. Signs are the object of a temporal apprenticeship, not of an abstract knowledge. To learn is first of all to consider a substance, an object, a being as if it emitted signs to be deciphered, interpreted. Everything which teaches us something emits signs, every act of learning is an interpretation of signs or hieroglyphs» [4, p. 12]. Thoughts of intelligence have their own value only because of the conventional meaning and the philosophy itself mistakenly leads us to presuppose good will for thought, desire and natural love of truth. In fact, philosophy only arrives at abstract truths which, according to Deleuze, compromise no one and disturb no one. «To seek the truth is to interpret, decipher, explicate. But this «explication» is identified with the development of the sign in itself. This is why the Search is always temporal, and the truth always a truth of time» [4, p. 26]. However, all that happens outside the subject-object relation that was (and for many remains to be) the alpha and omega of the cognitive process. «We are wrong to believe in facts; there are only signs. We are wrong to believe in truth; there are only interpretations» [4, p. 104-105]. These are the implications of the «divorce» of significants and significates. We became victims of «the dictation» of significants, which, according to our opinion, is unsustainable in the long term.

The characteristic trait of postmodern initiatives is also rejection of «will for truth» (or desire for truth) as one of the main strategies of human being. Through Proust we learn that we seek the truth only when we are forced by particular situations when we are exposed to a certain kind of violence which forces us to seek the truth. Truth is never the product of a prior disposition but the result of a violence in thought. It is pointless to talk about the (philosophical) method, there are only two fundamental themes stimulating to seek the truth – the accident of encounter and the pressures of constraints. Talking about natural desire for truth (or will for truth) is camouflage. The one who «wants the truth», what he wants is to interpret, to decipher, to translate, to find the meaning of the sign [See: 4, p. 24–25].

The characteristic trait of the existence of the modern human is their multidimensionality and polymorphism, fragmentation and internal contradictory. Humans, on the one hand, as a result of and in the conditions of the pluralistic ideology declared by power (and codified) aspires to their own selfhood, on the other hand, their thoughts, opinions and attitudes apparently show parameters of stereotypes. In the real social conditions the principle of pluralism is just a possibility (potency) for emergence and shaping own and original thought and reasoning. However, the right to express our thoughts has a sense only if we are able to have our own thoughts. The current situation assesses the intellectual and psychological state of the humans of the 21st century as voluntary abandonment of original and independent thought and acting, as its unwillingness to relish their freedom in the conditions developed by democratic (pluralistic) ideology, as «escape from freedom». The way of existence of modern humans in the vast majority of indicators corresponds to the mode «to have», not «to be». We witness a fatal deformation of the main attributes of the mode of being that Fromm believed were independence, freedom and critical thought [6, s. 72]. The essential signs of the mode «to be» - activity (but not in the form of being busy, but as an internal activity), creative use of their potential are increasingly more overlapped by the attributes of the mode *«to have»*.

However, the problem does not exhaust with the aspect above. Individual thought and own source do not depend exclusively on desire *to have* them. Apart from the desire also corresponding habits of mental activity are necessary, especially, reflectiveness! We believe that the full-valued existence of humans in the conditions of the declared pluralism requires the subject to give a developed reflection that is also characterised by realising the need to have own and critical thought and manifest them adequately. We do not believe that the reflectiveness of consciousness is a side and spontaneously formed product of basic education. The history of thought shows that reflection is formed in the process of intensive intellectual activity through realising (finding) self inside a certain tradition of thought (whose part also includes the educational system and educational model with defined training and educational objectives) and *critical* coming to terms with it.

However, the experience reveals that realisation of the right for own opinions is often the first but last «glimpse» (discovery) of intellect of many «selves», followed by a transition to passivity and the state when they let be «substituted» in thought and the performances *ratio* of the «Selves» will not exceed the horizon of reproduction and repetition of answers, statements, opinions formulated «by someone». As Barthes remarked on forms of mass culture – a disgraceful repetition (of the contents, the ideological schemes, the erasure of contradictions) and varying the forms just on the surface (more and more new books, new broadcasts, new films, various little stories), but always the same meaning [1, p. 146]. Opening more and more space for the forms of influence also means opening gates to mass consciousness, to «thought» of masses, to standard group or collective (corporative) way of commitment. Such attitude is «protected» from dogmatism because the *choice* of the model or «thinking» authority as a guarantor of personal position was made by a «free» individual decision. What escapes attention is that uncritical refusal of the general, the universal, the law, the value, the norm (like manifestations of dogmatism) make us captured by *alive incarnations of truth* (of political, ideological, religious dogmas...), often hiding in disguise of declared pluralism.

The idea of pluralism, in our opinion, implies that not only seeds of awakening the individuality but also its death. What will germinate from the seeds depends on conditions (environment) in which they end up. The current conditions form a basis that more significantly demonstrate the negative potential of pluralism. A quick look at the offer of the media reveals dominant elements of mass culture, signs of opinion identification, signs of

positions and ways of living at the expense of presentation of examples of really developed and independent thought. This situation (a shift towards mass culture) is greatly influenced by widely popularised relativisation of knowledge, values, norms, or a total rejection of them. This situation suppresses «will for truth» which we consider as one of the major factors forming independent thought. In this respect our position sharply diverges from the frequented postmodern diction that the truth is not sought but forms (also in the conditions of «isolated» discourse) or is a result of intersubjective consensus or creates a dialogue not influenced by power.

We note that present-day humans fail to handle the requirements and demands of the current pluralism and are not able to come to terms with it as *a subject* (we claim that despite the fact that individuality in such conditions manages not only to live but also survive!).

Barthes when justifying the need to open texts (a significant act for the literary science) writes on the issue citing an intertext: «In Papua», says the geographer Baron, «language is very impoverished; each tribe has its language and its vocabulary grows ever smaller because after each death several words are eliminated as a sign of mourning» On this point we outdo the Papuans: «we respectfully embalm the language of dead writers and reject the words and new meanings which appear as the world of ideas: the signs of mourning accompany birth and not death» [1, p. 90].

However, the same effect as the Papuans (that is to say, dying of language that we perceive as the indispensable grounds of critical thought) we can also achieve by a «suitable» content and curricular school reform — we will close texts (or we will not open them at all) because we will be lacking vocabulary and habits of critical rational thought. Through a suitable reform of the school system that will in a populist way (sophistically) emphasize «teaching» just what practical life *needs* (requires), no doubt we will achieve a certain level of informing (but not education, not to mention wisdom) that will unfortunately show parameters (quality) of semi-literacy. In comparison to pioneering school reforms of enlightened rulers *the product* of (post)modern *political* school reform will be able to orient itself in space in the format of short text messages SMS text messages, simple sentences, in which words will be bearers of just a single meaning that will depict or tell the receiver the existence of something that has already been named.

The principle of pluralism, which lies in the ground of postmodern world-view in connection with political power and suitable social conditions, negates the human individuality. Pluralism liberating the individuality from outside dogmatics, unfortunately, ends by recognition of illusiveness of subject individuality. In this respect we can characterize postmodern philosophy not only as a reaction to global expansion of mass psyche but also as an advocate (or viewer) such and there directing processes. Further, the formulations of postmodern ideas on levels and manifestations of pluralism are understandable to a relatively close circle of intellectuals. In this respect we assess the philosophy as elitist and aristocratic – which prevents it from becoming widespread thinking (conviction).

When comparing sophistic and postmodernist thought it is possible to discover not only similar traits but also significant differences. While sophists turned to masses through their *educational* programme, politicians and the so-called «new philosophers» parasitizing on philosophers - postmodernists create an image of mass consciousness in which they do not criticize it but rather describe as a reality, as a fact that cannot be surpassed. In this spirit we can say (despite the disapproval of many) that the strategy aiming at acquiring the so-called *subliminal* education (subliminal education means a maximum level of knowledge and habits defined by school reform that do not reach the minimum level required for starting the

individual subjectivisation process and subsequent manifestation of wisdom) the real pluralism of thought and behaviour becomes an elitist and aristocratic privilege. The individuality saved from developed reflection, from long-term and continuous work with own consciousness, thus saved from transformation to a subject, fulfils their needs through popularised sophistic and mass thought. For them the real pluralism of thought and free choice become *terra incognita* — an unknown and undiscovered (and perhaps because of power successfully forgotten) form of possible own realisation. Without dispute the systems bearing the prefix «post» catch a number of original, rational and meaningful ideas. To the detriment of their authors and representatives who failed to stop their universalization (dogmatisation) and elevation to the main organizing principles of knowledge and life of society, their abuse by (neoliberal) power and subsequent discreditation cause that the fate of Greek sophists befalls them — they are becoming just an episode in history of our thought.

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ТОЛЕРАНТНІСТЬ, ІНТОЛЕРАНТНІСТЬ І ОСВІТА В УМОВАХ ПЛЮРАЛІЗМУ

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Плюралізм в історії завжди був в опозиції монізму, універсалізму, тоталітаризму, догматизму, тобто конструкціям і теоріям, де цілісне підноситься над частинами, всезагальне над одиничним, однакове над різним. Визнання плюралізму в усіх сферах життя пов'язане з акцептацією (свободи) одиничного, індивідуального, особливого у всіх їхніх проявах, у тому числі і оригінального індивідуального мислення, дій і творчості. На практиці проголошена свобода «содіто» не приводить автоматично до свідомого «я», індивідуальне і незалежне мислення все частіше проявляється у формі масової свідомості, у формі «добровільного» підпорядкування індивідуального мислення загальним стандартам. Ці детермінанти суттєвим чином впливають на сучасну освіту.

Ключові слова: толерантність, плюралізм, волюнтаризм, ідеологія, свобода, інтолерантність, система освіти.