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OPPOSITION IN HYBRID REGIMES: A CASE STUDY OF UKRAINIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM DURING 2004–2014

Maryana Prokop

*Jan Kochanowski University,
Sv. Zhyromskoho str., 5, 25-369, Kielce, Poland
<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0135-863X>*

Magdalena Tomala

*Jan Kochanowski University,
Sv. Zhyromskoho str., 5, 25-369, Kielce, Poland
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1654-3590>*

Protracted and uncompleted process of transition of the most part of post-soviet countries from authoritarianism to democracy puts before a scientific community a question is in relation to determination of types of the political regimes that was formed in the marked states because of such uncompleted transition. Mainly an answer for the mentioned question is classification of these regimes as hybrid that characterizes the process of their balancing between democracy and authoritarianism. Ukraine is not exception in this context: during thirty years here the process of passing to the consolidated democratic regime haven't been completed. One of the indicators that give an opportunity to define the type of political regime is the degree of freedom of activity of opposition groups at its limits. Therefore the principles of activity of opposition in Ukraine during 2004–2014 are certain and investigated in the article.

On the basis of application of authorial methodology of the research is considered that functioning of political opposition, at Ukraine during marked period, hadn't been in keeping with the terms of the democratic regime in spite of the fact that statutory provisions that regulated activity of opposition were set at the level of the democratic regimes. A degree of violations the rights of opposition was not meaningful enough for the influencing on the electoral process and prevent it to come to the power by the results of the parliamentary elections. Therefore it does not ground to assert that political opposition in Ukraine operated in accordance with principles of the authoritarian regime. A thesis that the hybridity of the political regime in Ukraine finds the display, in that meaning, in the hybridization of operating of political opposition conditions as certain balance of principles, characteristic for activity of the oppositional groups within the limits of the democratic and authoritarian regimes is grounded.

Key words: political opposition, hybrid regimes, democracy, authoritarianism, opposition political groups in Ukraine.

Introduction. The long-term and unfinished process of systemic transition translates into the problem of classifying political regimes in accordance to the model solutions for political regimes. Thus, a lot of ways describing a given process occurred, including that by the category of hybrid regimes, taking place on a continuum between the antinomic ideal types¹. As an example

¹ Applying the category of ideal types, treated as an abstract model of essential features of a given phenomenon which does not in fact exist, enables to compare social phenomena in relation to the abstract model. The ideal types have their antinomy which is characterized by the opposite of essential qualities. Between the ideal type and its antinomy stretches a continuum on which real cases are placed. When they possess essential features of the ideal type or antinomies, they should be considered as similar cases. In a situation where they are not dominated by clear features of the ideal type or antinomies, they take the character of hybrid regimes. This type of approach enables the creation of a gradual classification. In the study of political systems, it will enable considering whether the studied cases should be treated as close to ideal types or through the prism of a hybrid of essential features. [1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6].

of this phenomenon could be states which balancing process between the systemic practice typical for both democratic and authoritarianism systems is a process of long-term and unfinished transition. It contributed to the emergence of some kind of dualism, because these states, on the one hand, have significant features of a democratic regime, but on the other hand, they often use particular undemocratic tools of authoritarian regimes in their political practice.

Ukraine is a good example of this phenomenon, defined as one of the hybrid regimes, which process of balancing between systemic practices is typical for the systems of both democracy and authoritarianism. A free activity of opposition groups is a significant feature of democratic regime. The aim of the article was to solve the research problem, i.e. to what extent the functioning of opposition in Ukraine in 2004–2014 was based on the principles of democratic regimes and to what extent on the principles of authoritarian ones? The results obtained during the survey enable to state that hybridity of Ukrainian political system translates into the functioning of political opposition in the state through the balance of democratic standards and undemocratic solutions which constitutes a hybridization of conditions for the functioning of political opposition.

The concept of hybrid regime as an indicator of democracy “Democracy Index” [7] is used in the classification of the Economist Intelligence Unit (a research unit belonging to the weekly *The Economist*), which deals with describing the state of democracy in the world. It considers a division into full (liberal) democracies, flawed (electoral) democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes (authoritarian consolidation). The concept of hybrid regimes also appeared in reports of the American Freedom House foundation, which monitors political transformations in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine also belongs to this group, because despite meeting democratic standards in political practice, undemocratic solutions are frequently applied.

Hybrid regimes category most commonly is applied in relation to the evolution of European countries, especially in the former Soviet republics. One of the first who used the “hybrid regimes” term was a Hungarian sociologist, Elemér Hankiss [8], for description the communist regime of Hungary during the rule of János Kadar. Among the researchers who investigate the hybrid regimes, such scientists should be mentioned as Guillermo O’Donnell [9], Larry Diamond [10], Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry L. Karl [11]. It is believed that these scientists were the first to make the attempt of interpretation the concept of hybrid regimes and to introduce this term in political science. Polish researchers, Andrzej Antoszewski and Ryszard Herbut [12], in the consideration of the political systems use the term of a “grey zone” between democracy and authoritarianism and the term of delegative democracy. Among the scientists who investigate this problem we would like to mention: Lucan Way, Steven Levitsky [13], Gennadiy Shypunov [14], Mykola Riabchuk [15], Dmitriy Furman [16], Jan Holzer and Stanislav Balik [17] and Thomas Carothers [18].

The problem of the interpretation ambiguity of the hybrid regimes has led to the emergence of many competing concepts, as well as to attempts of their interpretation through the related concept. Researches who investigate the regimes of states which are placed between democracy and authoritarianism use different notions such as “incomplete democracy”, “directed democracy”, “guided democracy”, “semidemocracy”, “delegative democracy”, “illiberal democracy”, “semi-authoritarian regime”, “competitive authoritarianism”, “grey zone”, “regime of ruled pluralism”, “regime of the power’s dominance”, and “anocracy” [6; 19; 20; 21].

The functioning of opposition is an essential feature of democracy, because on the one hand it contributes to implementation of the principle of political pluralism, and on the other hand – the principle of alternation of power. Political pluralism means plurality, multiplicity and diversity of political groups, while the alternation of power not only relates to the replacement of ruling elite, but above all it comes down to whether the opposition had any real chance of gaining

power (in free elections on equal terms with the ruling party). In authoritarianism, the functioning of opposition is limited, all kinds of pressure are applied and the opposition is deprived of the opportunity to participate in election process on equal terms [19; 20; 21]. Ukrainian political system constitutes an interesting case in terms of functioning of the political opposition in state, as it is an example of hybrid regime which combines the features of both democracy and authoritarianism. This provides a basis for research on the functioning of opposition in regimes, with incomplete systemic transition, combining elements of two types of political regimes.

The research covers the years 2004–2014, thus the period between the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. The given decade was significant in the context of formation and functioning of political opposition in the state, as well as social opposition to the actions of the authorities. The aim of the article is to solve the research problem, i.e. to what extent the functioning of opposition in Ukraine in 2004–2014 was based on the principles of democratic regimes and to what extent on the principles of authoritarian ones? The research problem allows us to propose a hypothesis for the study: the hybrid nature of the political system in Ukraine is feeding through to the functioning of political opposition in the state by balancing between democratic standards and undemocratic solutions. Taking into account the specifics of the conducted research, the aim of the study is to apply a diagnostic research and verification, but not a discriminative and chronological approach to the functioning of political opposition in Ukraine. Two research methods were used in the study: content analysis and comparative method.

Methods. Considering ideal types according to Max Weber [1; 2], it seems possible to formulate the principles of functioning of opposition in democratic regimes: the opportunity to form opposition groups; the opportunity to participate in the election process on equal terms; the opportunity to gain power. It corresponds to absence or limitation of these principles based on antinomy in authoritarian regime (absence/limitation of opportunity to form opposition groups; absence/limitation of opportunity to participate in the election process, absence/limitation of opportunity to gain power (Table 1).

Table 1

Functioning of opposition in democratic and authoritarian regimes

Variables	Democracy		Authoritarianism	
	D ₁	+	-	A ₁
opportunity to form opposition	D ₁	+	-	A ₁
opportunity to participate in the election process on equal terms	D ₂	+	-	A ₂
opportunity to gain power	D ₃	+	-	A ₃

Source: own elaboration

In order to reveal the principles of functioning of the political opposition in Ukraine, it should be made an analysis of the provisions of the law in the context of whether or not the given opportunities were provided. It is worth noting that taking into account the specificity of hybrid regimes, i.e. the use of non-democratic mechanisms in political practice, the mere fact of the existence of certain provisions of law does not prove that political opposition in the analysed period functioned on the principles of democratic regime, as these principles could be not applied by the authorities, i.e. like under authoritarian regimes. Due to the above, it seems appropriate to verify the application of the provisions in practice.

Verification of the variable D₁/A₁ (i.e. whether the opportunity to form opposition groups was provided) enables to confirm the existence of opposition groups. The opportunity to form opposition groups is ensured if there are groups that do not support the ruling party of the day

in the party system of the state, which argue the need to change the ruling elite and propose an alternative policy of actions. The opportunity is not ensured if there are no groups opposing the policy of the ruling elite among the registered parties, or if the pressure is applied, against the groups which consider themselves to be opposition, preventing them from participating in political affairs.

Verification of the variable D_2/A_2 (i.e. whether the opportunity to participate in the election process on equal terms was provided) is made based on the reports from research units on the process of elections and whether the mechanisms of pressure against the opposition were used. The opportunity to participate in election process on equal terms was ensured to a large extent if the reports of the research units do not contain mentions about the pressure against the opposition. This opportunity was not ensured if the results of the reports confirm a large-scale pressure and restrictions on the actions of the opposition.

The variable D_3/A_3 (i.e. whether the opportunity to gain power by opposition was provided) is verified based on the results of the parliamentary elections and whether the opposition was successful in gaining power. This opportunity was ensured if the opposition achieved a significant result in the elections (i.e. exceeded the election threshold). The opportunity was not ensured if the opposition failed to cross the election threshold.

Determination of findings. There are three possibilities within the framework of the proposed scale. The first one corresponds to the case when political opposition functions in accordance to the principles of democracy. Thus, the opposition has an opportunity to form and operate within political groups, to participate in the election process, and to take a power in the case of winning elections. The second one corresponds to the case when the legislation introduces significant restrictions on functioning of opposition groups. It results in difficulties for forming and functioning of political groups. In practice, different types of pressure are applied. The role of opposition takes a marginal form and the use of pressure is a premise for authoritarian regimes. The third one corresponds to the case when it could be clearly stated that principles related to the functioning of opposition were ensured (that supports democracy), or when there is a significant violation of the principles, although such solutions could not be clearly defined as authoritarian, as some democratic principles have been ensured. In this case, we consider that functioning of opposition was carried out in accordance with the principles of hybrid regimes, i.e. by balancing between democratic and authoritarian standards. For the purposes of this study, we define such case as hybridization of conditions for functioning of political opposition.

The functioning of political opposition in Ukraine. In order to determine whether the legal provisions translate into the practice in terms of functioning of opposition, the variable D_1/A_1 should be verified. An important stage in the formation of Ukrainian opposition was the end of the 1990s and the start of the 2000s, when functioning of political groups in Ukraine and determination of their oppositional nature was based on the principles of support/non-support for the policy of the then president Leonid Kuchma. L. Hurska-Kowalczyk [22, pp. 264-265] emphasizes, that those supporting the policy of the head of state form the majority in 1998–2002, while the situation reversed after the parliamentary elections in 2002 and anti-presidential opposition became the dominant one. The breakthrough moment for the formation of the radical wing of the Ukrainian opposition was a split in the All-Ukrainian Association “Community” (ukr.: *Всеукраїнське об'єднання “Громада”*) due to the resignation of Yuliia Tymoshenko (the first deputy) and Oleksandr Turchynov (the deputy chairman of the party), and the arrest of the party leader Pavlo Lazarenko. In March 1999, members of the party established the fraction “Fatherland” in the Supreme Council of Ukraine (ukr. *Верховна Рада України*; hereafter: Verkhovna Rada), and on September 16, 1999, a new one – the All-Ukrainian Union

“Fatherland” (ukr.: *Всеукраїнське об'єднання “Батьківщина”*) was registered [23]. In the early 2000s, the parliamentary arrangement reflected pro-presidential and pro-government support. The expression of a vote of no confidence in the government of Viktor Yushchenko in 2001 confirmed the formation of pro-presidential majority [24]. In 2002, the “Our Ukraine” (ukr.: *Наша Україна*) electoral bloc was established, headed by V. Yushchenko. “Our Ukraine” party was registered on March 22, 2005 [23]. On the other hand, pro-presidential groups formed “For United Ukraine!” (ukr.: *За єдину Україну!*) electoral bloc. From the parliamentary elections in 2002 to the presidential elections in 2004, among the strongest opposition groups were the “Our Ukraine” and the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc [22, pp. 265-274]. After the presidential elections in 2004, the candidates of opposition parties, V. Yushchenko and Yu. Tymoshenko, assumed the functions of president and prime minister. In 2005–2006, the head of government was changed twice, first one was Yuriy Yekhanurov for several months, then – Viktor Yanukovich. After the early parliamentary elections in 2007, Yu. Tymoshenko became the head of the government again, but then a split in the “orange camp” occurred to which both the president and the prime minister belonged. In 2010, the oppositional party “The Party of Regions” (ukr.: *Партія регіонів*) of V. Yanukovich won the presidential elections. Thus, the oppositional party gained the right to form a government. In 2010–2012, entities that defined themselves as opposition appeared on Ukrainian political scene, i.e. the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”. (ukr.: *Всеукраїнське об'єднання “Свобода”*) and the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform of Vitali Klitschko (ukr.: *Український демократичний альянс за реформи Віталія Кличка*) (the acronym UDAR/УДАР translates to “strike” or “punch”) although there were not new parties. However, after the parliamentary elections, only the ruling party was given an opportunity to form a government. Consequently, it is worth noting that there were opposition groups on the Ukrainian political scene, both in relation to the president and the government’s policy. This confirms that political opposition in Ukraine had the opportunity to pursue political activity.

The opportunity to participate in election process on equal terms. The given opportunity is largely regulated by provisions of the electoral law. Ukrainian electoral system is characterized by frequent changes in law on the election of deputies, considering the time period from 2004 to 2014, which includes the parliamentary elections in 2006, 2007 (early elections) and 2012². Therefore, the provisions of 2004 and 2012 should be taken into account. It is worth emphasizing that provisions introduced by electoral regulations are addressed to all entities of the election process on the equal terms. A time for submitting candidates and their registration are the same for all of them and cover 30 days according to the provisions of 2004 [25, Article 55(2)] and 12 days – of 2012 [26, Article 52(1)]. Similarly, in the case of provisions on conditions for registering candidates for elections, the amount of the advance payment is the same for all candidates [25, Article 59; 26, Article 56].

The electoral law contains conditions for conducting an election campaign, the possibility of using free transmission time on equal terms and a payment for their use according to equal rules for all entities. However, the law applied in the parliamentary elections of 2012 contained several restrictions, i.e. absence of provision allowing political parties to participate in elections within electoral blocs, a significant shortening of the deadline for registering candidates and a relatively high amount of cash advance that the entity have to pay for registration. This can be treated as a clear sign of limiting the opportunity to stand as a candidate for oppositional Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc in the context of research on the political opposition in Ukraine [6, pp. 90-93].

² The presidential election process was not analysed due to the fact that after the Orange Revolution the basic law was amended, while the Ukraine became a parliamentary cabinet republic. Apart from this, the parliamentary elections deeply reflect the process of the political opposition and the struggle for power.

The study on actual implementation of a given variable was made based on the analysis of reports relating to the election process, as well as the reports of independent research units of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and Freedom House (FH). There were four groups defining themselves as opposition participated in the parliamentary elections of 2002. These elections took place before mass strikes and the efforts of opposition to remove the president from office. According to the analysed reports (i.e. OSCE, PACE, FH), the opposition was given the opportunity to participate in the election process, but this participation was not on equal footing with pro-presidential groups. This applies in particular to the Our Ukraine Bloc and the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc. The applied restrictions were mainly related to the manner of conducting the election campaign (including access to the media and election agitation). This is also related to the freedom of mass media (assessed at the level of 5.5 out of 7 in 2003 by FH, where “1” – reflects a fully independent media, while “7” – media deprived of freedom, therefore the score of 5.5 describes them as strongly deprived of freedom) (Report of the Freedom House, Ukraine, 2003). The dependence and politicization of media largely came from the fact that they mostly belonged to the oligarchs who supported the president’s actions, so the media content was based on supporting the president during the election campaign [27; 28; 29].

The parliamentary elections of 2006 in the discussed reports were assessed more positively compared to the elections of 2002 in the context of ability of opposition to participate in the election process. This largely concerned the freedom of submitting and registering candidates of the opposition and conducting an election campaign [30; 31]. It is noteworthy that in the 2006 report of FH media freedom in Ukraine was assessed at the level of 3.75, which largely reflects the improvement in media freedom at the time of the parliamentary elections of 2002 [32; 33]. The early parliamentary elections were assessed as such largely enabling the participation of opposition groups in the election process. There were noted violations of the election process, but in a broader sense they did not affect the participation of opposition [33]. The freedom of media, according to FH, was improved – Ukraine was awarded by 3.5 points [34; 35].

In the case of parliamentary elections of 2012, there were revealed restrictions on opposition. This mainly concerns the court verdict and the arrest of Yuliia Tymoshenko (the leader of the opposition bloc) and Yuriy Lutsenko. At this point it should be stressed that judicial institutions could be used to remove inconvenient candidates. Thus, the actions of authorities were deliberate in order to prevent the party from participating in the elections. Noteworthy, it is emphasized that such version of the electoral law of 2012, which did not contain the provision on the ability of electoral blocs to participate in the elections, was the intended action of authorities aimed at limiting the participation of opposition [35; 36; 37]. The level of freedom of media in Ukraine was deteriorated and amounted 4.0 points.

The opportunity to gain a power. The provisions on whether the opposition had a chance to gain a power largely reflect whether the principle of alternation of power is implemented in the state, i.e. whether the opposition had real chance to gain a power by taking part in the election process on the same terms with other entities. Thus, this indicator partially corresponds to the indicator described above. Meanwhile, it is not limited to the election campaign, but constitutes a much broader variable covering the entire election process which includes the announcement of results and the legitimation of power. Therefore, the real opportunity to gain a power by opposition in Ukraine is very important, as the provisions of electoral law regulating the parliamentary elections in 2004–2014 do not reflect the degree of implementation of a given opportunity.

In the 2006 parliamentary elections, five parties joined the Verkhovna Rada: the Party of Regions (which received 32.14 per cent of the vote), the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc (22.14 per cent),

the Our Ukraine Bloc (13.95 per cent), The Socialist Party of Ukraine (5.69 per cent) and the Communist Party of Ukraine (3.66 per cent) [38]. In August 2006, the government of the opposition leader V. Yanukovich was appointed. The conflict between the president on the one hand, and the government and parliamentary majority on the other, changed the balance of power in the parliament. It led to a deep political crisis, which became the main reason for the president's decision to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada.

In the early 2007 elections to the Verkhovna Rada, the election threshold was successfully crossed by five groups: the Party of Regions (34.37 per cent), the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc (30.71 per cent), the Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense Bloc (14.15 per cent), the Communist Party of Ukraine (5.39 per cent) and the Lytvyn Block (3.96 per cent) [39]. Four (out of five) political groups entered the parliament again. It seems appropriate to emphasize that the balance of opposition powers has changed to a large extent because of tension in the "orange camp." While in the 2006 elections we were dealing with the presidential opposition, in 2007 – the opposition had two dimensions: on the one hand, the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc and the Our Ukraine party, which participated in the elections as pro-presidential groups, but simultaneously in opposition to the government headed by V. Yanukovich; and on the other hand – the Party of Regions as a pro-government party, but in opposition to the president. The elimination of dualism was favoured by the formation of a coalition government of the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc and the Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense Bloc led by Tymoshenko, thus the Party of Regions became an opposition to both the president and the government [40].

Instability on political scene of the state and the conflict in the ruling structures (a tension between the President V. Yushchenko and the Prime Minister Yu. Tymoshenko) became a background for actions of the opposition, and consequently contributed to the victory of V. Yanukovich in the presidential election of 2010 [41, pp. 59–82]. After the 2012 parliamentary elections, the parliament consisted of: the Party of Regions (30 per cent), the Fatherland Coalition (25.54 per cent), the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform of Vitali Klitschko (13.96 per cent), the Communist Party of Ukraine (13.18 per cent) and the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" (10.44 per cent) [42]. Despite the fact that three opposition political powers (the Coalition "Fatherland," "UDAR," and "Svoboda") entered parliament, a pro-government and pro-presidential Party of Regions was given the opportunity to shape the government.

Findings. The analysis of law regulating the functioning of political opposition in Ukraine in 2004–2014 allowed us to determine whether and to what extent it was ensured, as well as to identify whether the opposition has appropriate conditions for functioning in terms of democracy. Are there any restrictions on the functioning of opposition proper to authoritarian regimes? Considering the opportunity to form opposition groups, Ukrainian legislation is conducive to the establishment of new entities, as it does not introduce restrictions preventing the formation of new groups. Additionally, legal provisions in this field are respected, which translates into real opportunities for the emergence of new and oppositional entities on the Ukrainian political scene. Another variable related to the opportunity to participate in elections on equal terms is considered to be ensured by the law. It comes from the fact that no restrictions were used which largely influenced the participation of opposition. However, the Ukraine Law of 2012 [43] does not provide an opportunity for groups to participate within the electoral blocs. Meanwhile, considering the process of election campaign assessed by the international research units, it could be stated that this opportunity was not fully ensured because of restrictions applied to the opposition in the context of submitting and registering candidates as well as conducting an election campaign. In the case of gaining power – this opportunity was ensured, because the opposition groups were given the opportunity to gain a power and used it in the parliamentary

elections. The last variable concerning the determination of the status of parliamentary opposition is considered to be ensured partially, due to the fact that the status of opposition was the first time defined in the Resolution of 2008 and no re-provisions were made in 2010.

Therefore, based on the results obtained during the study we can conclude that provisions regulating the functioning of political opposition are implemented to a large extent at the level of democratic regimes. However, the status of opposition was not fully regulated during the analysed period. Taking into account the real state of matter regarding implementation of the given opportunities, we can state that the functioning of political opposition in Ukraine in 2004–2014 can't be defined as proper to the conditions of democratic regimes (Table 2). Some kind of balance can be observed here, as on the one hand, the Ukrainian legislation ensures the opportunity of establishing and functioning of opposition groups, but on the other hand – it does not contain legal provisions defining the status of the parliamentary opposition. Moreover, a range of restrictions on the participation of opposition took place in the election process.

Table 2

Functioning of political opposition in Ukraine in 2004-2014

Variables	Result
opportunity to form opposition groups	+
opportunity to participate in the election process on equal terms	+/-
opportunity to gain power	+/-

Source: own elaboration.

Conclusions. Hybrid regimes are characterized by a balance between democracy and authoritarianism. Thus, countries included in this group use a combination of democratic standards with authoritarian solutions in their political practice. The aim of this article was to define how the hybridity of the Ukrainian political regime translates into the functioning of opposition in the state. In order to determine the conditions of functioning of political opposition in Ukraine, it was appropriate to understand whether the opposition had the opportunity to participate in political life in accordance with the rules applicable in democratic states, or the restrictions had been applied to it as in authoritarian regimes?

Solution of the research problem related to the functioning of political opposition on the example of the political system of Ukraine in 2004–2014, on the one hand, required an analysis of the legislation regulating the functioning of political entities, including opposition. On the other hand, it required a study of the real state of the functioning of opposition, i.e. whether the legal provisions were fully respected. The study of the legal framework was based on analysis of the provisions regarding the formation and registration of political parties and their participation in the election process. The results obtained during the study of legal provisions indicate that Ukrainian legislation ensured the right to form new groups, including the opposition ones, and to participate in the election process. Although the position of political opposition was not clearly determined in Ukrainian legislation – this concerns the status of parliamentary opposition. The reports of the international research units, regarding the extent to which the provisions of the law translated into the functioning of opposition, contained information about violations in the election process, not the equal treatment of the opposition and restrictions applied to it (i.e. the arrest of Yu. Tymoshenko and Yu. Lutsenko in 2009, who are considered to be political prisoners by the international community).

Therefore, in light of the research problem presented in the introduction by comparing the provisions of the law and the real state of matter, we are able to conclude that the functioning of political opposition in Ukraine in 2004–2014 did not correspond to the conditions of democratic regimes. In turn, the level of violations and irregularities was not significant enough to influence the election process and prevent the opposition from gaining power in parliamentary elections. Thus, we have no grounds to state that political opposition in Ukraine functioned on the principles of authoritarian regimes. In this way, the hybridity of Ukrainian political regime also translates into the functioning of political opposition, creating a balance of solutions from both democracy and authoritarianism, and also constituting a hybridization of conditions for the functioning of political opposition in the state.

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ОПОЗИЦІЯ В ГІБРИДНИХ РЕЖИМАХ: ПРИКЛАД ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ СИСТЕМИ УКРАЇНИ У 2004–2014 РОКАХ

Мар'яна Прокоп

*Університет Яна Кохановського,
вул. Св. Жиромського, 5, 25-369, м. Кельце, Польща
<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0135-863X>*

Магдалена Томала

*Університет Яна Кохановського,
вул. Св. Жиромського, 5, 25-369, м. Кельце, Польща
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1654-3590>*

Тривалий та незавершений процес переходу більшості пострадянських країн від авторитаризму до демократії ставить перед науковим співтовариством питання щодо визначення типів політичних режимів, які сформувались у зазначених державах унаслідок такого незавершеного переходу. Переважно відповіддю на згадане питання є класифікація цих режимів як гібридних, що характеризує процес їхнього балансування між демократією та авторитаризмом. Не виключенням у цьому контексті є й Україна, яка протягом ось уже тридцяти років не може завершити перехід до консолідованого демократичного режиму. Одним з індикаторів, який дає змогу визначити тип політичного режиму, є ступінь свободи діяльності опозиційних груп у його межах. Тож у статті досліджено та визначено принципи діяльності опозиції в Україні протягом 2004–2014 років.

На підставі застосування авторської методології дослідження визначено, що функціонування політичної опозиції в Україні протягом зазначеного періоду не відповідало умовам демократичного режиму, попри те, що законодавчі положення, які регулювали діяльність опозиції, були встановлені на рівні демократичних режимів. Однак ступінь порушень прав опозиції був недостатньо значущим, щоби вплинути на виборчий процес та завадити їй прийти до влади за результатами парламентських виборів. Тож це не дає підстав стверджувати, що політична опозиція в Україні діяла відповідно до принципів авторитарного режиму. Відповідно, обґрунтовано тезу, що гібридність політичного режиму в Україні знаходить свій вияв у тому числі в гібридизації умов функціонування політичної опозиції як певного балансу принципів, характерних для діяльності опозиційних груп у межах демократичних та авторитарних режимів.

Ключові слова: політична опозиція, гібридні режими, демократія, авторитаризм, опозиційні політичні групи в Україні.