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**MOTIVES OF POSTMODERN IN HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY
(ALIENATION AND FORMATIONAL CRISIS ON THE EXAMPLE OF CYNICISM)**

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Our time is the era of postmodern. It ruptures with the pursuit of truth, because being is unfathomable, and expresses opinions but not knowledge through short stories. These stories aren't represented as a system and their writing is consistent not with the laws of being but with the rules of the conversation or game. Therefore such stories are written not seriously and they claim neither on explanation nor on change the world. Such renunciation from systematicity, rationality and practical significance leads philosophy on the road of self-negation or "deconstruction". History of philosophy gets trend from "construction" to "deconstruction". However, transition from modern to postmodern doesn't exhaust history of philosophy. Its holistic contemplation reveals cyclic alternation of "construction" and "deconstruction": systems of Democritus and Plato and "Various Stories", scholastic scholarship and "Letters of Obscure Men", systems of Hegel and Marx and "Tympan" of Derrida. This cyclic recurrence allows to search regularities in the history of philosophy, determines the relevance of the analysis of internal (philosophical) and external (social) reasons for such oscillations.

Key words: postmodern, alienation, philosophical system, deconstruction, irony.

"Deconstruction" of philosophy in Hellenism. Displaying of alienation in Cynicism

Hellenistic "deconstruction" of philosophy expresses disintegration of system "physics-logics-ethics": the first, as Ariston said, is above us, the second is not for us and only the last concerns us [1, p. 317]. Disintegration of system leads to dissipation of the criteria of truth and falsehood and, consequently, to dissolution of the criteria of good and evil because goodness is knowledge. Therefore, the world loses certainty and meaning and the game becomes the only way to do with it.

Philosophy enters the consumption: anecdotes of Diogenes Laertius or Elian are told at feasts, and their "patchwork" transforms any funny incident into philosophy and there is no place for philosophy. It evokes protest. But according to the rules of the game protest should be expressed also by means of game because there are no other forms.

The transformation of philosophy to game, when "doggy" Diogenes occupies a place of eloquent Plato, is a manifestation of inanity to change world by means of cognition. The reason of it is not in defects of cognition but in social relationships – change of the world occurs through interaction of people. But the interaction wherein, as Diogenes said, people compete who would be the first which pushing another into the ditch [1, p. 242], excludes the success of social transformations: it's too late to teach, it remains to mock.

The Cynics expose to mockery the foundations of social life. They deny private property comprehending its connection with commodity fetishism, with the conversion of human being in commodity or in a servant of commodity. "It's better", as Diogenes notes, "to be a sheep at Megarian inhabitant than a son" [1, p. 246], because Megarians look after about sheep as commodity but they don't care about son. Such replacement of human being by commodity shows to the

Cynics an incarnation of the essential powers of human being in something external, alien for him (in the money, land and slaves). This substitution discloses the essential powers as unnecessary for such man that have money. For example, there is unnecessary to be eloquent but necessary to have money to buy rhetor. There is unnecessary to play on cittern but necessary to have money to buy kifared etc. “You would be quite happy”, as Diogenes said to wealthy man, “if your slave wiped your nose; do slash your hands then it will be so” [1, p. 248]. That is, by purchasing of a slave (of his feet, hands, head), rich man eliminates the need to have all of this himself and thus the rich man turns into nothing or the cheapest place in the house.

The Cynics deny compromise with the authorities, disclose the myth about philosopher-counselor. Philosopher doesn't change a tyrant but changes himself in favor of the tyrant; philosopher doesn't unselfishly serve truth but sells himself to for the tyrant. “If you were able to wash vegetables”, as Diogenes said to Plato, “you wouldn't have to serve to Dionisios” [1, p. 252]. Tyrant buys philosopher as rich man buys slave. But, unlike the slave, the philosopher sells himself falling under the captivating charm of the authorities and attributing intelligence and virtue to the ruler. Therefore, the power, like money, is able to convert a person into something he is not, in the sage as Dionisios, in the god as Alexander. And here it does not matter whether Plato considers Dionisios a wise or the Athenians consider Alexander the god; it is important that they do so as if it were true.

The Cynics deny religious superstitions, disclose rituals as a way of the illusory satisfaction of needs: “Unhappy!”, said Diogenes to the praying man, “you don't understand that the purification does correct neither the sins of life nor grammatical errors” [1, p. 247]. Rituals, initiations into mysteries “as if” convert vicious sinner in virtuous person; they give him the right to be pleased by himself, at the fact that he remains the same person. Consequently they make a person even more perverted.

Briefly, the Cynics deny all alienated form of human existence (property, authorities, religion), everything that hides the essence of man from himself making him not that he is. Such denial is essentially revolutionary; it is a threat to social order and therefore should be punished. However, punishment does not occur: the Athenians burned works of Protagoras, they expelled Anaxagoras and put to death Socrates but they liked Diogenes and, as wrote namesake of the last, presented him with a new cask [1, p. 247]. The reason for this indulgence and even love is in the form of denial. This form is not rational and conceptual but the game and therefore it disappears therein the line between wisdom and madness, truth and falsehood, criticism and verbiage. And, therefore, the Athenians can not accept seriously the Cynics and enjoy their own prudence in front of the face of their stupidity.

The game puts the Cynics outside society and reconciles the society with them. The Cynics get freedom: they deny property, power and they live as if did not have them. For example, Diogenes asks his friends not to “give him the money” but to give back “his money” [1, p. 248]. However, in reality, property and power continue to exist, but for others. That is to say, the Cynics reach a freedom not due to the changes in the social system but by excluding themselves from this system, and their freedom coexists with unfreedom. Therefore, their freedom has no real basis and depends on the patience of power. But power endures it until the Cynics play.

Reasons for “deconstruction” of philosophy in Hellenism.

Alienation in society

Hellenism is the time of destruction of the classical polis. During this period, land property is concentrated in a few hands, slave labor displaces free labor; economically independent citizen as social basis of democracy disappears and power goes to the oligarchy.

New conditions change the relationship of man to society and to himself. In the classical polis a person perceives public duty as his own, in the Hellenistic polis – as something alien. For example, during the Greco-Persian wars the Athenians were fighting for their freedom, for the right “with ease and grace to manifest their personality in a variety of conditions of life” [2, p. 508]. In the Hellenistic wars (in Alexander’s wars) the Athenian was fighting for his slavery, for the enrichment of their “own” oligarchy and the destruction of democracy. In these circumstances, something that is useful for power, does not benefit for man. Polis is converted to force that is alien and hostile to man; it occurs an alienation of man from polis and from society because polis is a form of social organization. The person remains alone.

Person manifests itself in interaction with others and disruption of social connections attaches antinomy to his being. He needs men (“I am looking for the person” [1, p. 247]) and despises the people (“There is full of people but a little of persons” [1, p. 253]). He makes himself by judge of others (“I’m a winner of men” [1, p. 247]) and humiliates himself before them. He denies values of polis (“I’m citizen of the world” [1, p. 254]) and sees the tragic curse of their loss. He tries to “cancel” this antinomy positively in restoring of social relations and “cancels” it negatively in the alienation from others.

Alienation from others deprives the human activities of sense. “Appropriation” of being, changing of natural and social world, occurs in conjunction of private actions. But now the “appropriation” is impossible even with goodwill. Alexander could restore Thebes at the request of Crates but Crates doesn’t see the sense in it: the new Alexander will come and destroy Thebes again [1, p. 264]. And Crates is right: soon the time of diadochi will come. Hope for the implementation of social projects disappears and so disappear the projects themselves. Plato wrote “State” in the hope of changing society. Now writing is pointless.

Interest in nature also disappears: neither atoms of Democritus, nor “ideas” of Plato will help in a hostile world. Now nature is reduced to human nature, or rather, to the animal in man, and by this quality it confronts with social being similarly freedom confronts to coercion. That is, as Marx wrote, “there is obtained such a position that the person feels himself like freely acting only when fulfilling his animal functions (eating, drinking, sexual acts) and he feels himself only as animal in the own human functions” [3, p. 91]. Crates loosens up Metrokles and Hipparchia convincing the first of them “send forth a wind” and the second lie down with him (with Crates) in front of everybody. Here animal qualities in man convert into valor and social qualities turn into cowardice. An alienation of man from the human qualities in him occurs, that is, self-alienation.

Alienation of man from others turns around by alienation of man from himself. It is logical that the person turns into an animal in the absence of social ways of self-expression.

Impossibility for man to express himself in social activities is an evidence of formational crisis, that is, that method of organizing of people in society prevents their activism. Man strives to action but it is impossible to act. Antisthenes considers labor as a boon [1, p. 237]. But the opportunity to labor for free man has sunk into oblivion from Hesiod time; farmer went bankrupt and lost ground. Athenians, including the poor men, appreciated democracy but economic inequality essentially excluded them from politics. Athens is “school of Hellas” [2, p. 508]. But teaching in Athens is unsafe (Socrates was executed), useless (social processes get out of control) and there is nobody (people come running not for philosophical conversations but for fun). So there is nothing left for Diogenes except as “squeal like a bird” [1, p. 242].

“Deconstruction” of philosophy nowadays.

Displaying of alienation in postmodern

The being of philosophical systems from Aristotle to Heidegger, according to Derrida, is permeated by “phallogocentrism and logocentrism” [4, p. 19], and therefore eliminates the “lib-

erty at the attitude of the philosophical order” [4, p. 18–19]. The “appropriative dominance” of philosophical systems is a threat because it outputs philosophy from under a fire of criticism. And this dominance is subject to “deconstruction” through the destruction of systematic and rational nature of philosophy.

“Deconstruction” of philosophy destroys the evaluation criteria of being and knowledge about it. That is, by Baudrillard, “the performing of calculations in terms of beauty or ugliness, of truth or falsehood, of good or evil is as impossible as to calculate the velocity of particle and its position in space at the same time” [5, p. 11]. Here the classical problems of philosophy (truth, goodness, beauty) are unsolvable and all projects by the explanation and by the change of being are illusory. And therefore you need to write differently, to recognize the chaos, mixing of categories, epatage as the norm.

Hence follow paradoxes, for example, a rational proof of the absence of rationality (Feyerabend), destruction of philosophy by the forces of philosophy (Derrida), etc. All these paradoxes show “how easy is to fool people in a rational manner” [6, p. 164]. And paradoxes do not require a positive “removal”, do not targeted on thinking over the problem. Their goal is the transformation of rationality into a tediousness, of philosophy into a joke, of life into a game.

Paradoxes express metamorphosis of the concept of “freedom”: the transition from freedom through knowledge of the laws of being (“modern”) to freedom through negation of the laws of being (“postmodern”). A man of postmodern, like the Cynic, is anarchist; he denies everything that limits him including science because the laws of science constrain his imagination by distinguishing between possible and impossible. This denial in postmodern, again like denial in Cynicism, does not concern to the world as such: laws of being continue to exist and science continues their studying. Hence the new paradox: the inviolability of the world promotes anarchy of spirit. For example, Feyerabend boldly advocates the separation of school from science because he knows that his advice will not be realized and he will still be able to rely on doctors or engineers. That is, responsibility for a written word disappears, you can write anything you want, and with it, the value of the written word also disappears, no one reads your texts. So, an alienation from creativity arises.

The alienation from creativity leads to the denial and misunderstanding of “big story”. This story is inappropriate in the present because there is no currently great goals, great heroes and all utopias have been realized. It is inappropriate also in the past since Hegel or Marx (if you follow the logic of postmodernism) wrote not for the benefit of humanity but for enjoying the endless rotation of one and the same categorical wheel – “tympanum”. The creativity loses humanistic sense and there is indistinguishable between the natural and social in it; Derrida not accidentally equates phallocentrism and logocentrism.

The alienation of philosophical creativity from humanism and the transformation of philosophy at trivial thirst of domination depersonalize philosophical systems. As neither materialism nor idealism, neither dialectic nor metaphysics or neither communism nor liberalism at postmodern perusal serve to mankind, all they are nothing else than the closed to itself “water-wheels”. Hence human indifference to the basic questions of philosophy, his weariness of old games and readiness for the new game: the game of “deconstruction”.

Causes of “deconstruction” of present-day philosophy.

Alienation in society

Postmodern, according to Baudrillard, is a time when all utopias have been realized, and we should continue to live as if that was not [5, p. 8]. Hence the paradox: the dreams that come true deprive us of the strength to live. But have dreams come true whether?

Dream (and purpose) of mankind, as Engels wrote rightly, is a “leap from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom” [7, p. 295]. That is leap from the kingdom of alienated being, kingdom of domination unknown natural and social forces over man, to the kingdom of appropriated being, kingdom of man’s dominion over cognized natural and social forces. Through this leap man (= mankind) becomes a genuine creator of himself and completes its separation from nature, becomes by creator (but not by toy) of history. Therefore the degree of a person’s control over their own social relations is the measure of freedom (and of dream).

But postmodernism is not time of the “appropriation” of being by man and for man. On the contrary, this is a time of human perplexity before chaos of being.

The man of postmodern loses himself in the infinitely reproducing processes of production, policies and information. He is forced to act but his action, as Baudrillard stressed, is devoid of meaning, value and idea. And, therefore, this is alienated action, the action to which man remains indifferent secretly. And this indifference is hopeless: progress, science, technology, revolution – all it has been but nothing has saved human.

Hence the paradox: at the external feverish activity person is internally passive; he finds the strength to adapt to life, to include himself to the overall game but he has no power to change life. For example, he finds the strength to sell himself as a commodity on the market (and even to be indignant by this) but he has no power to change attitudes in society. And this powerlessness he justifies that “capital has moved into a different orbit, out of limits of industrial relations and political antagonisms” [5, p. 18]. Thus he supposes capital inaccessible and problem unsolvable or, rather, he shifts the problem (but not capital) to another orbit, beyond limits of solvable.

Recognition of his own powerlessness alienates man from the human in him: from the creativity, knowledge, practice. The man in these conditions refuses from knowledge because knowledge imposes on him a duty to act. For example, if Marx is right, you need to change society. But, if Baudrillard is right, and “capital has moved to another orbit” it remains to ascertain “deadlock in political economy” [5, p. 18]. In the first case you need to act, in the second case you can go to sleep. And as the second is preferable for alienated man so the “deconstruction” of philosophy finds to its adepts.

“Deconstruction” of philosophy deprives a person of the ability to change the world because the jump into the realm of freedom requires an awareness of the laws of being. Therefore, postmodern, at all the seeming freedom (or, rather, at ideological disorder) is compatible with the actual unfreedom, with a forced human activity under the authority of uncontrolled social forces. And, then, dreams are far from implementation.

Baudrillard’s paradox, a man lost himself in being as a result of the implementation of utopias, is imaginary: utopias have not been realized. Moreover, attempts of their implementation encountered resistance of social system. And here the chaos, so vividly described in postmodern, does not weaken but increases the stability of order; at the seeming disorder no one is responsible for anything and there is no guilty. For example, the economic crisis has arisen by “fault” of markets. But the market is neither by a capitalist and nor a tyrant; you cannot fight with it; it cannot be overthrown: it is none and everything. In other words, the market, like the fate in the ancient world, is cruel, headstrong and unknowable. Thus, the Hellenistic powerlessness of man is reproduced in a new way in which even the good will of Alexander does not guarantee salvation of Thebes. This alienation of social life from a person expresses an antagonistic contradiction between man (with his desire for freedom) and social system (that reproduces unfreedom), in other words, it expresses the transformation of the social system into the “shackles” for person, that is, formational crisis.

*Crisis of the present and crisis of the past.
Postmodern in the mirror of Cynicism*

Postmodern and Cynicism are combined by disappointment in human beings: a person was gone, a mass has swallowed him. Hence, the antinomy of their worldview: the longing for man ("I am looking for a man!" [1, p. 247]) and bravado before a crowd ("There are few persons among array of people" [1, p. 253]). And the "removal" of this antinomy is in bravado because the crowd laughs over dreamers and is afraid of cynics.

Diogenes and Baudrillard both try to live with the truth: to wait for something from crowd is silly. "Indifference of masses relates to their essence", teaches Baudrillard, "and any revolutionary hope, any expectation on social change remain by hope and expectation exclusively for one reason: masses go away, shy away from ideals" [8, p. 19–20]. The problem is that to live with this "truth" is difficult and cognition and creativity are impossible, because cognition requires an implementation of the ideals in the practical change of social being. Therefore, neither the postmodern philosopher nor philosopher-Cynic can create systems; they are alone in the face of the crowd.

In this loneliness (equal to infertility) is disclosed the social nature of creativity: the philosopher creates as a social being and waiting for the response of society. And, therefore, indifference of society to the ideals, the alienation of society from history, deprives philosopher of creative power, of hope for future. There is no coincidence that postmodern is the end of modernism but not the beginning of something new.

"As society itself produces man as man", Marx wrote, "so and he produces society" [3, p. 118]. Hence the danger of circle, because alienated society produces alienated man who produces alienated society, and the ability to get out of it since people change themselves and society in revolutionary practice.

Motion in a circle is the reproduction of the old principles. It is given not only in apologetics, because apologetics with the increase of instability becomes problematic, but in the "deconstruction" without "construction".

Game of postmodernist philosopher (as also Cynic philosopher) consists in destroying (but not in creation), thus it cannot be a real alternative to the existing order and therefore is transformed into an elitist form of culture. Neither Diogenes nor Baudrillard spoke to the crowd. For them, crowd (people, masses) is not a subject of history but is something amorphous, mindless and dark, in short: "black hole, whither sociality falls through" [8, p. 8]. They deprive crowd of voice and so pay to crowd for its indifference. Here a mutual indifference that perpetuates alienation arises; crowd has alienated from philosopher and philosopher has alienated from crowd. It shapes the "spiral of alienation" (becoming isolated in the circle) in moving by which philosophy and practice are endlessly removed from each other; philosopher says, crowd acts, and nobody understands anybody.

In these conditions philosopher opposes himself to the crowd, defines crowd as something inherently unwise and inactive and disclaims of any obligation for cognition of the laws of being. This way he fastens his own and the public unfreedom because the change of being begins from its cognition.

The mapping of postmodern in the mirror of Cynicism extends the time horizons: the past loses monotonicity, it included both "construction" and "deconstruction"; and the present loses the absoluteness because current "deconstruction" is not the end of philosophy. Alternation the periods of "construction" and "deconstruction" reveals conjugation of philosophical and social crises or, rather, reveals the "deconstruction" of philosophy as a manifestation of alienation in society. That is, "deconstruction" shows itself not as the negation of philosophy "generally" but

as a denial of philosophy in its concrete historical form. And, therefore, it is expected the recovery of philosophy in the new form, in the form of the “removed” alienation.

Conversion of forms of social organization in the “shackles” of man generates alienated forms of activity including the alienated forms of philosophizing: the Cynicism and the post-modern. Therefore, the theoretical critique of these forms allows us to formulate transformation conditions of philosophy, the conditions of its new “construction”.

Cynic philosopher (or postmodernist) excludes social interaction, opposes himself to the crowd and the crowd to himself. Diogenes shouts: “I am calling for people, not for scoundrels” [1, p. 243–244]. Under these conditions of mutual alienation a negative character is inherent for the “revaluation of values”; well done such man, “who wanted to get married and did not get married, wanted to travel and did not go, was going to go in for into politics and did not engage in it” [1, p. 242]. That is the good fellow who excluded himself out of the system of social relations and thus has won freedom for himself. The problem is that such freedom is essentially unfreedom; the person excluded himself from human activities and became by nothing. As a result, mutual alienation of the philosopher and the crowd is destructive for both sides; neither a philosopher nor a crowd or, rather, the people, cannot find a way out of the crisis.

Therefore restoration of philosophy, its “reconstruction”, is associated with a change in the relation of philosopher to society, with their interaction and creation in this interaction of new values for the practical changes in social life. That is, according to Marx, it is associated with the theoretical critique of social alienation system and with its practical revolutionary transformation [9, p. 2]. The last is difficult due to the domination of alienated forms of social life, forms of weaning people from social activities. But without this transformation the “removal” of alienation is impossible because, as experience of Cynicism shows, the search for individual freedom out the freedom of society gives the illusion of freedom, turns to the alienation of man from himself.

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**МОТИВИ ПОСТМОДЕРНУ В ФІЛОСОФІЇ ЕЛЛІНІЗМУ
(ВІДЧУЖЕННЯ ТА ФОРМАЦІЙНА КРИЗА НА ПРИКЛАДІ КІНІЗМУ)****Марія Предсіна**

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Наш час – час постмодерну. Ми відмовляємося від пошуків істини, тому що буття не можна пізнати, та висловлюємо думки (але не знання) в «малих» оповіданнях. Ці оповідання не відтворюють буття як систему, та їх написання визначається не законами буття, а правилами розмови чи гри. Тому вони є щось не серйозне та не претендують ані на пояснення, ані на зміну світа. Така відмова від системності, раціональності, практичної значущості призводить до самозаперечення філософії, тобто до «деконструкції». Історія філософії починає розглядатися як шлях від «конструкції» до «деконструкції». Але перехід від модерну до постмодерну – ще не уся історія філософії. В історії філософії є циклічність у чергуванні «конструкції» та «деконструкції»: системи Демокрита і Платона та «строкаті» оповідання, схоластичні системи та «листи темних людей», системи Гегеля та Маркса і «тімпан» Дерріди. Наявність цієї циклічності дає змогу шукати закономірності в історії філософії, визначає актуальність аналізу внутрішніх (філософських) та зовнішніх (соціальних) чинників такого чергування.

Ключові слова: постмодерн, відчуження, філософська система, деконструкція, іронія.